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Abstract
This article is a free ranging discussion on the rapid reshaping of the relationships between the 
major world powers. Here it will be argued that globalised liberal economic bonds are rapidly 
being replaced by a stronger sphere of inﬂ uence from China. Attempts to understand some of the 
factors which have led to this shift will be discussed with respect to: the rise of regional anger 
and resentment, fast-paced Chinese economic expansion, the growing political stature of China, 
and failures in social and political consensus in the United States. 
This second part of this article will focus how such a shift in regional dominance could produce a 
world of ‘multi-polarism’ or usher in a new form of globalization that has its axis in the east 
rather than in the west. Diﬀ ering views on the history of regional expansion will be discussed 
followed by a look at China’s rising power. 
Finally, discussion of China as a successfully functioning meritocratic system as an alternative to 
western democracy will be countered by criticisms that the Chinese ruling party still remains 
authoritarian in nature and is expanding under its power and control. 
　Keywords:  International relations, Nation-States, Globalisation, ‘Multi-polarism’, Nationalism, 
China
This article includes the following two parts and their subheadings:
Part I ‒ The Fractures
I. Deﬁ nitions of ‘Multi-polarism’
II. The Age of Anger People
III. Arrogance in the Asian Paciﬁ c
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IV. Growing group-think in the West
Part II ‒ Chinese Meritocracy
I. Deﬁ nitions of Meritocracy ‒ Everyone is good at something 
II. Guns, Germs and Steel Revisited
III. Chinese Meritocracy or Authoritarianism
IV. Conclusion - Intervention is not the answer
Part I ‒ The Fractures
I. Deﬁ nitions of ‘Multi-polarism’
If we consider deﬁ nitions of economic and political relations among regions of the world, two 
incongruous terms emerge: Multi-polarity and Globalization. The latter is a demonstrable, 
rational and institutionalize term. As defined by The International Monetary Fund's (IMF), 
globalization is:
　　　 'the growing economic interdependence of countries worldwide through increasing 
volume and variety of cross border transactions in goods and services, freer international 
capital ﬂ ows , and more rapid and widespread diﬀ usion of technology’.1
Historically, ‘multipolarity’ was a deﬁ nition of international relations based on land power and 
came before globalisation. Historian E.H Carr deﬁ ned multipolarity as:
　　　 .... a distribution of power in which more than two nation-states have nearly equal 
amounts of military, cultural, and economic inﬂ uence. (1961)
Joseph Stiglitz, in his book ‘Globalization and its Discontents’ in 2002, qualiﬁ es the IMF deﬁ nition 
by saying that the management of globalization is key to its success or failure. Managed at a 
national government level, there is more chances for success as embracing cultural 
characteristics of each individual country help stability and long-term planning. However, when 
it is managed by international institutions such as IMF, the pressure to balance payments and 
maintain the proﬁ t motive for rich capital speculators undermines long-term regional planning 
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and wise savings management for poorer countries involved in global free trade. E.H Carr echoed 
this view in terms of power in his 1961 book ‘What is History’. He wrote that a multipolar world 
can create alliances and cooperation as pragmatism takes over from ideology as a way to 
mutually beneﬁ t disparate regions.   
The prosaic deﬁ nition of globalisation by the IMF is therefore challenged by Stiglitz and Carr in 
terms of the implicit power relationships of the rich over the poor and the lack of balance from 
regional autonomy in policy decision making. In 2002, Stiglitz did not fully address the support 
for globalised trade given by the US military as he did in subsequent books. Particularly in Asia, 
where a lot of Stiglitz’s focus lies, the military presence in Guam, South Korea, The Philippines, 
Singapore, Australia, and most notably in Japan, serves as an example of gun-boat diplomacy in 
its most explicit form. This can categorize US-led globalization as broadly an authoritarian one. 
In 2017, the geo-political tectonics of the Asian region could be slowly shifting away from this 
militarily protected ‘un-free’ free trade arrangement, to one where a challenge to globalization 
involves a credible opposition. Could the emergence for a Chinese military force reshape 
globalization into a ‘multi-polarised’ world with characteristics of the past or indeed replace it 
with a new form of globalization? And if so, what factors could lay the ground work for such a 
takeover?  
This article does not seek to detail a coming war with China as the new largest economy collides 
with the largest established military power that is the United States. Noam Chomsky categorises 
a myriad of social, agricultural and infrastructural problems that will prevent China ever 
becoming a unilateral power.  Rather, it seeks to oﬀ er a deﬁ nition of a world where China exploits 
its balance of payments surpluses to grow its global reach through investments and international 
construction projects with the backing of a well-funded military and strong nationalistic rhetoric. 
This could occur because a rise of China’s power, and to a less extend the resurgence of Russian 
power, does not allow free-market capitalism to escalate above the rule of the political parties in 
both countries. Issues of the exploitation of China’s internal labour-market notwithstanding, the 
rise of ‘multi-polarism’ may well go hand-in-hand with a more planned approach to economic 
development. Later in this article, a discussion of Chomsky’s view that China still does not have 
the technological expertise, nationwide education systems nor the commitments to 
environmental stability that western countries possess. Rather, China’s confidence is a vulgar 
‘nouveau riche’ blaster that is more dream than reality.
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To judge whether we are entering a multi-polar world, some deﬁ nitions need to be applied and 
compared to recent examples. 1) A pole can be defined as an actor that produces order in a 
region but also can create disorder if it wants to. 2) This actor can have inﬂ uence over regions 
beyond its borders. 3) This actor has enough concentrated wealth and military capabilities to 
block or disrupt other major poles from carrying out their objectives. 
With these deﬁ nitions in mind, the United States has had such inﬂ uences over multiple regions 
of the world from South America, the Middle East and Japan for many decades. However, since 
2010s China’s pole action can be shown. In Africa, China’s plans for infrastructure building 
projects have included construction of a Chinese controlled city outside of Johannesburg known 
as the Zendai Modderfontein Project, started in 2015. In 2017, China showed its inﬂ uence in the 
negotiation of peace talks between North Korea and the US, South Korea, Japan alliance. 
South Korea and the United States hold military exercises on the border with North Korea 
twice a year. These actions occur during the rice harvest seasons of April and August to 
maximise disruption of the manpower that is divide between defence against invasion and the 
need for 1.2 million people to work in the low technology harvesting of food. The southern 
manoeuvres are one of the direct threats to the nutrition of the north. In previous years, this 
provocation has been met by rhetorical denouncements by North Korea but very little direct 
action. In August 2017, North Korea fired a missile over Japan to test its range, sending a 
direct counter provocation. China’s position as peace-making in the conflict allowed it to 
denounce the United Nation resolutions on missile ﬁ ring as ineﬀ ective and to oﬀ er to mediate 
a dialogue between the two Korean nations, Japan and the US. Thus China boosted its image 
on the world stage. 
China’s power brokering presents a challenge for impatient actors like the United States. 
According to Mathew Burrows and Roger George in their article - Is America Ready for a 
Multipolar World? (2017), a return to a post-World War Two outlook for helping other countries 
and regions of the world through sharing their interests would serve the new balances of power 
much better than the ‘do or die’ globalism of Hillary Clinton. Issues such as the proliferation of 
glocal2 terrorism, climate change, and helping failing nation states should be considered and 
tackled multilaterally in a new era of American diplomacy. 
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The next part of this article will look at how much of the free market economic model has led to 
anger and discontentment on an individual or emotional level. The displacement of people 
physically and psychologically has played a major role in the lack of support to US-led globalism.
II. The Age of Angry People
In his book the Age of Angry, Pankaj Mishra writes about the rise in ‘popularism’ and a distrust 
of governing bodies in rich and poorer democratic countries.  He says that waves of anger in 
diﬀ erent disparate locals follow a similar pattern of resentment from people who were promised 
lives of opportunity through hard work and equal rights but have found that there are merely 
hired muscles, physical or mental, to support corporate proﬁ ts and global interests. In cases of 
economic migration, the antipathy by some natives to inﬂ uxes of people trying to pursue a better 
life has shown similar displays of anger and ‘popularist’ resentment. So the angry immigrant is 
met with the angry native in a bear-pit of anger. 
Mishra’s book is a history of feelings and emotion rather than a conventional historical 
document. He sees the rejection of Europe by Britain in Brexit over migration and the rejection of 
Hillary Clinton’s global capitalism for support for Donald Trump’s appeal for the good old days in 
America as two sides of the same coin.  On terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East and in 
America, Mishra sees young men acting with very low levels of understanding of Islam and 
religious texts but with very high levels of disdain for a superior presence controlling them that 
they do not identify with. He talks about how rationalism plays no part in a terrorist thinking, 
just anger. The misreading of Islamic texts and the presumed deliverance to glory make sense in 
the mind of the suicide bomber. 
Mishra even claims that the Oklahoma bomber Timothy McVeigh and Ramzi Yousef, the 
bomber of the ﬁ rst world trade centre attack in 1993, and nephew of one of the bombers of 
the 9/11 attack in 2001, were in adjacent cells in a Colorado Prison in 1998. Ramzi is said to 
describe McVeigh as having the closest personality and beliefs to himself he had ever met.  
Mishra believes that much of the resentment and anger comes from feelings of displacement, 
whether it is in the form of economic migration, watching an unrecognisable ruling class or 
noticing that hard work has not produced the intended life results. 
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Mishra is not an optimist and believes his home country of India, one of the most populous 
nations on earth, will not bring prosperity to its people. Similarly pessimistic is writer Morris 
Berman who believes China will fall into the same trap when he talks about the similarly 
populous nation becoming American capitalism in Mandarin. He claims China displays much of 
the characteristics of the United States after World War Two at the height of its economic power.
III. Arrogance in the Asian Paciﬁ c
After the initial excitement and disbelief for a lottery win or high stakes gamble, the lucky winner 
has time to reﬂ ect on how their good fortunate will shape their lives. New plans can emerge that 
were unthinkable just a short time before and a sense of grandeur and pride enters that will 
allow the new prince or princess to conﬁ dently modify their surroundings. Crucially, personality 
traits that were curtailed by income, immediate environments, and general living spaces are now 
free to develop. The individual’s internal thought process, constitution and reﬂ ections on the past 
can now be altered more easily due to a change in fortunate. This is the situation that China now 
ﬁ nds itself in by the 2010s. 
From a World Bank estimate of 30% rural poverty rates in 1970 to a head count of just 1.9% of 
the population living on $1.90 dollars a day, China’s meteoric rise may feel like a kind of 
psychological lottery win. China’s development of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the south 
eastern region under leader Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s built on the success of agricultural 
surplus market reformations. In turn, Deng created a gold rush for cheap labour by greedy 
foreigners to establish oﬀ shore companies without the need to maintain welfare rights. Much of 
the power of labour unions in the United States and Britain suﬀ ered as a result. As Will Hutton 
points out in his book ‘The Writing on the Wall ‒ China and the West in the 21st Century’ (2007), 
the symbiotic relationship of short-term economic gain from cheaper production costs for 
western countries and the political economy of a state run China has meant that both have 
rapidly served each other’s interests. However, such a relationship has never taken into account 
the big distances between the creditors and debtors involved. Much of the blow back from 
Middle Eastern incursions by the United States have left Western and Central Europe paying the 
price in micro terrorism acts since 2001 and China is beginning to remember its past conﬂ icts in 
the Asia Paciﬁ c region in the diﬀ erence light of rising economic and military power. The West 
has emboldened China to assert itself in the region and re-engage in historical conflicts that 
should remain historic. The rapid rise of China’s economic and military power has been too quick 
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to allow social and cultural reﬂ ection. They are not tempering their behaviour abroad with an 
understanding of the other cultures that make up the constituency of the Asia Paciﬁ c. 
As a study from Hong Kong Polytechnic details, the perceptions of mainland Chinese tourists 
travelling to areas like Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, and further aﬁ eld as Europe is so poor that 
many tourist site owners are considering if the Chinese tourists dollars are worth the aggravation 
the accompanying behaviours bring to the workers and the local areas. This lack of respect has 
its roots in the lawlessness of large parts of mainland China and the resultant corruption that 
national and region leaders have shown. This in turn is copied by the lower classes and pervades 
among the psychology of the land and results in a belief that money is the arbiter of right and 
wrong. In fact, as Yong Chen writes in his work on Chinese tourism around Asia, most disputes 
are either caused or demanded to be resolved by money. 
Unlike other Asian nations, religion has the least eﬀ ect on Chinese lives. Since the Communist 
Revolution of 1949 proclaimed the Chinese state above all other institutions, Buddhism and 
Daoism are largely negligible under the oﬃ  cial atheist state rule. The Buddhism, Shintoism, and 
Christianity of many other Asian nations is absent in China, which creates a vertical relationship 
between its citizens and the State that is not balanced by any contemplated alternative realities. 
The staggering growth rates in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as cited by Will Hutton, in the 
period from just 2004 to 2006 tripled. Up to 80% of this output has come from Chinese bank 
lending for the development of manufacture. Coupled with the insatiable greed of foreign 
companies to exploit this highly managed form of capitalism, the worship of money above all else 
is not diﬃ  cult to see. This may well be an important, yet dangerous, method of control by the 
Chinese state to remain in power. To replace Chinese people rioting for democracy with people 
rioting for Apple iPhones seems to be a healthier situation for bureaucrats and ‘apparatchiks3’ to 
be in. The pro-democracy protests of 1989, along with the more recent ‘Umbrella’ movement 
(2014) in Hong Kong have little or no chance of success against the current economic force 
behind the Chinese state. Also, the opposition of many students in Taiwan to free trade deals 
with mainland China, known as the ‘Sunflower’ movement (2014), will equally meet with an 
almost impossible struggle. 
Although commendable and laudable, the eﬀ orts by neighbouring satellite states to democratize, 
and even in the case of Thailand to spiritualize China, will not work. At every turn, China’s world 
hand of poker is getting stronger. In his recent article in the Asia Times, ‘Eurasian integration 
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meets America First’, Pepe Escobar shows how hapless America policy decisions under President 
Donald Trump are gifting power and inﬂ uence to China on a weekly basis. As America cancelled 
its involvement in the 2016 Paris Climate Change Agreement (COP21) to deal with greenhouse 
gas emissions, so China stepped in to oﬀ er to ﬁ ght emissions with European leaders, develop 
new green technology and raise $100 billion a year to tackle the global over-production of 
pollution. These promises may not be trusted by many European leaders but it translates a 
political capital for China. 
Other large projects set to dwarf any non-Chinese involved initiatives in Asia or the Far East is 
the planned Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This project is set to design roads across Russia on 
into Germany and Spain, ports in Pakistan, Myanmar and around Africa, bridges in mountainous 
terrains in Bangladesh and Myanmar, and various gas and oil pipelines across most of central 
Russia. The main plan launched in 2013 produced the ﬁ rst meeting with Russian, Myanmarian 
and Pakistani leaders in May 2017 in Beijing. Noticeably absent were leaders from America, 
Britain or the European Union. The official statement of intent claims it is to boost trade and 
stimulate economic growth across Asia and other areas. Principally, this is a Chinese state funded 
project with China wanting to control the building of the infrastructure. Unlike, previous foreign 
investments by western nations overseas, this $900 billion project would involve Chinese 
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workers directly in large numbers to work alongside locals in each region. The roads and 
pipelines would move one quarter of all the world’s goods and services involving 65 % of the 
world’s population in one capacity or another. Ironically, much of the investment into China from 
Japan, Europe and mostly America have laid the ﬁ nancial basis for the plan yet these countries 
will be largely excluded from its production and direct benefit. Escobar comments that this 
‘Modern Silk Road’ instead of replacing US-led globalisation with a multi-polar world balance 
seeks to impose a Chinese-led map for a new type of globalisation. 
In only a few short years, China is attempting to develop multiple projects in multiple countries 
at the expense of western nations, particularly the United States. Escobar says that the 
government in Beijing would like to oﬀ er more partnerships with Western European countries 
via cheap trading routes and access to cheap energy, with the help of Russia. This would have 
the eﬀ ect of making European ﬁ rms and trading centres bypass the United States strategic hold 
on the area and weaken them considerably, this would also favour Russia to a greater extent.
Russia is also continuing to play a stronger polarising role on the world stage, albeit a lesser one 
than China. Accusations and sanctions against Russia by the United States over election meddling 
and military incursions into Crimea do not seem to have effected Vladimir Putin’s Russia too 
much. Russia’s domestic agricultural boom, oil and gas exports and robust manufacturing has 
made it easy for them to move closer to China and other South Asian nations like India in terms 
of cooperation and trading links. In fact, Escobar says it was Russia that agreed for India to join 
into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) even though India is not a Central Asian 
nation.
With the new Belt and Road initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation of Central Asia and the 
increasing involvement of surrounding countries like India, Iran and some parts of Africa, it is no 
wonder that a new trading currency would develop to facilitate these transactions and 
interactions that does not use the US dollar. One such system is the Central Bank of Russia credit 
system known as ‘Mir’. 
In 2014, Russian banks responded to sanctions on international payments by Visa and 
MasterCard made on Russian credit. The Central Bank of Russia establishing their own credit 
system as Russian people were ﬁ nding it hard to make payments with Visa or MasterCard. By 
2017, the largest Russia bank Sberbank had 80,000 functioning outlet for the Mir card with 
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more growing daily. Sberbank estimates 45 million users by mid-2017. With countries moving 
away from dollar-based credit systems, the price of credit increases in the United States as 
bankruptcy cannot be allowed as a ﬁ nal option on any non-payment. This was how individuals 
and businesses could risk credit to spend or build in the US with the servicing on any debt being 
borne by global credit companies like Visa and MasterCard denominated in dollars. In an ironic 
move, McDonalds in Russia started accepting Mir payment cards in its restaurants in 2016. 
China itself has its long established UnionPay systems backed by HSBC which operates inside 
and outside China as well as the launch of AliPay in 2017 based on the Alibaba shopping website 
in China. All these rivals to dollar denominated credit are mainly domestic in nature. However, 
Escobar writing in his article ‘Why Washington is terriﬁ ed of Russia-China’, says there are plans 
to create a gold-backed currency system that is pan-Asian which will function much like the Euro 
currency does in Europe. 
IV. Growing Group Identity 
If Morris Berman is right and China is a form of American capitalism waiting to happen, then the 
model of American decline should be a lesson to the state leadership. Curtailing its citizenships 
belief in concepts of exceptionalism should be a survival strategy. Certainly, the grandeur and 
self-indulgence that was characterised in the America iconography of Donald Trump’s image has 
rendered a lot of the parody of him irrelevant. The culture of narcissism as laid out in 
Christopher Lasch’s book of the same name in 1979 predicted a rootless existence that is 
obsessed with novelty and has contempt for the past. Modern day critics of progressive left-wing 
political movements in America like Ben Shapiro and Jordan Peterson would argue that the 
growth of identity politics and the need for personal spaces are two sides of the same narcissist’s 
coin. For a declinist like Morris Berman, America never had a past built on sustainable agrarian 
or artisanal values that he sees in Japan or in large parts of Europe. He says that ‘creative 
destruction’ has always only been the direction of the United States and that self-interest and 
actions, whether personal, political or mechanical done without thought for the consequences 
were not deviant behaviours but the true values of the nation. Furthermore, any deﬁ nition of 
America as anything other than a hustler state is delusional. The US is ready to trick and exploit 
their own regions ‒ normally the North over the South ‒ and other parts of the developing world. 
In his book ‘Why America Failed’ (2012),  Berman talks about how the left-wing of American 
politics realized that opposition to the capitalist system was unwinnable and that a retreat into 
issues of race and gender have been a useful cover to media debates that can ignore the real 
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issues of ‘who is doing what to who’. Power and control over wages, working conditions, health 
beneﬁ ts, freedom and choice can go unchanged and unchallenged with a state government full of 
‘gender-neutral’, ‘non-binary’ people. ‘Real politics’, as he sees it, does not need or use notions of 
race and gender. Conflicts on America university campuses of what is acceptable and 
unacceptable cultural appropriations by one identiﬁ ed group over another have become the only 
issues debated by students. Much of the promotion of these issues has been by lecturers chieﬂ y 
from social science departments.
As trite as some of these concepts of race and gender are, Berman claims that attempts to ‘un-
educate’ and rewrite history to reflect these identity-based representations are the most 
dangerous part. He cites the reprinting of Mark Twain’s texts to remove any oﬀ ensive phrases or 
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words that describe characters of the 19th century as they were depicted to reframe them as 
existing in the 2010s. This lack of historical distance and contextualisation is a symptom of the 
decline of American cultural life according to Berman. 
Where Berman sees debates in race and gender as a waste of time, clinical psychology Jordan 
Peterson understands a more serious social engineering program being implemented at a 
legislative level on employment practices that are politically motivated rather than having a basis 
in behavioural psychology. In the United States and in his own home country of Canada, he sees 
changes in laws that can eﬀ ect job hiring and the types of terminologies permitted in the work 
place. Constructed forms of social identity are require to have equal status under the law whether 
they exist naturally or not. For example, quotas of gender, race and sexual orientation are 
becoming mandatory in hiring practices regardless of career history and expertise. In job hiring, 
focus is on an equality of outcome rather than on an equality of opportunity.
According to Peterson, many of the sexual identities adopted by young people are far too casual 
in their psychological construction to be a determinate of a psychology profile of a person. 
Peterson believes that much of the race and gender debate is formed on whimsy but is no less 
dangerous. He cites Swiss clinical psychologist Jean Piaget’s work on child development, saying 
that a lot of the complex actions by a child form much larger and stronger personality traits in 
adults than identities chosen by young adults when they are university students. Even the act of 
breast feeding requires a complex system of negotiations and interactions that shape subsequent 
approaches by the child. Many laboured actions with new environments that a child has to 
undergo develop into psychologist skills that form long before teenage years. Definitions of 
gender are a combination of biological factors down to a cellular level and the child’s interaction 
with the world. He states that still today 99.7% of male and female deﬁ nitions are ﬁ xed this way.
According to Peterson, in Sweden, social and legal equality among the sexes has led to more 
gender division rather than less. Studies of women choosing care-giving subjects increased and 
subjects that involved the formation ideas and technical problem solving declined for women 
with more freedom to choose. 
In opposite, America and Canada proposed changes in university course student quotas and 
employment laws has started to include testing for implicit psychological attributes in individuals. 
In short, this means that in the State of Ontario, Canada an individual can be tested at their work 
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place for elements of sexism and racism present in their subconscious brain. This unconscious 
bias testing would then produce a score requiring an individual to be re-educated if found with 
an undesirable subconscious. Peterson doubts the validity of these tests and claims the political 
motive behind them stems from ideologies based on a critique of western patriarchal white male 
oppression of all other groupings that require social justice or balancing. It is these forced 
bifurcations that Peterson sees as the real oppression. Groups of people defined purely on a 
social construction can by definition divide exponentially, ironically back to the level of the 
individual which was the basis for modern western civilisation in the Age of Enlightenment in the 
late 17th and 18th century. For Peterson, the subsequent set of rights to freedom and liberty given 
to an individual under much of western law are given at birth and are only in conﬂ ict if they 
encroach on another individual’s rights. Then the court system is used to sort out the problem. 
Peterson says that new laws obligating the individual to think and feel in a certain way were 
designed in a utopian way that appear clear and correct on paper but will not work in practice. 
He says that Pierre Trudeau’s government in 1980-1984 in Canada was one of the first 
developed nations to impose official bilingualism and official multiculturalism on its people 
whether it grew organically from the population in each area of the country or not. Therefore 
such adoption of new gender speciﬁ c and race speciﬁ c laws in Canada have a clearer precedent 
that Peterson believes does not reﬂ ect the true nature of the people of Canada.
Peterson questions the validity of the implicit association test results as the margins for error 
and correlation of results to a speciﬁ c pattern are not scientiﬁ c enough to oﬀ er reliable data on 
an individual’s opinions on race, gender, age, sexuality and other similar criteria. He claims that 
the same tests taken by the same person on a diﬀ erent day have produced diﬀ erent results. He 
describes the tests as formulated from a set of rules on which opinions should be considered 
acceptable and those that are not. For Peterson, questions of bias could empirically show the 
mind set of particular group in a particular space over time, yet his real objection is that test 
results should not be described as wrong or undesirable. In a boarder sense, ‘wrong-think’ 
suggests a planned view of correct or incorrect opinions and micro-behaviours being a way to 
deal with issues of multiculturalism and group identity in America and Canada. In his lectures, 
Peterson reminds his audience that psychology, social and clinical, is an applied science not a 
stem science discipline and any results from testing should be treated just as data. 
Group identity and claims of post-modern power relationships of identity groups by patriarchal 
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oppressors is what Peterson calls a ‘sleight-of-hand’ trick for a communist ideology. Whether 
intentionally or not, the mind-set for ‘wrong-think’ is dangerous as it values planned actions 
above that of individual questioning. The prevalence of deﬁ nitions of power relationships taught 
in American and Canadian Social Science departments in universities with the absence of much 
economic analysis of societal relationships is a concern for Peterson. The promise of deliverance 
from oppression sounds like communism in disguise. In large public works this would serve 
governments well if harnessed in the right way to further its interests. Referring to the previous 
section above, the rapid utilization of China’s recent wealth into global public projects like the 
‘Belt and Road Initiative’ over building savings and smaller scale guarantees of long-term 
prosperity show that planned economies are still very active in the world and ready to construct 
‘utopias’ as soon as they get the chance. 
If China’s rapid turn-around in capital accumulation, direct investment, and building construction 
projects is a form of transformative globalisation, then what is the hope that a diﬀ erent world 
order could emerge without the substitution of one superpower for another? This second part of 
the article discusses deﬁ nitions of meritocracy and some diﬀ erent ways regions of the world can 
be viewed.
Part II ‒ Chinese Meritocracy
I. Deﬁ nitions of Meritocracy ‒ Everyone is good at something
In 2016, data journalist David McCandless designed a light-hearted map for the world entitled 
‘International Number-Ones’. In his - not too rigorous- Internet research, he and his team tried to 
ﬁ nd something positive that every country in the world is good at. From Sweden’s pop music to 
Fiji’s mahogany wood to Paraguay’s sense of positivity to Kyrgyzstan’s walnut forests, 
McCandless’s map is a colour-coded ﬂ ag of mostly positive but some negative top concentrations 
of a particular activity, natural resource or developed skill. What David McCandless’s fun map 
does show is that diﬀ erent parts of the world have developed diﬀ erently and that diﬀ erence can, 
through faster technology, be understood and reﬂ ected on in more detail and at speed than ever 
before. Such available information about cultural and artistic diﬀ erence is starting to be taken 
seriously at an economic level, according to Morton Schapiro and Gary Saul Morson, authors of 
‘Cents and Sensibility: What Economics Can Learn from the Humanities’ (2017). In this book they 
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argue that economists, investors and global companies have incurred large ﬁ nancial costs and 
costs to their reputations when a regional culture is not taken into consideration during 
economic planning. One way to learn more about the eﬀ ects that economic policies might have 
when imposed on a region from outside is to read the literature, modern and ancient, of that 
region.
Schapiro and Morson argue that the facts and empiricism from one area may not work in other 
areas when exported for a number of cultural factors. Many American economic policies 
attempted abroad have failed as much as succeeded. Even further down the road of an economic 
colonisation of a region, say the US over Japan, the behavioural patterns of companies and 
individuals might be diﬀ erent.  From 1955 to 1975 Japanese domestic household savings rates 
were 23.5% of income, by far the highest among the 35 Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries. The Japanese characteristics of delayed gratification and 
sacrifice can still be found in Japanese thinking dating back through a long history of 
uninterrupted peace and sustainability that produced its fruits over time. Literature from 
the Tokugawa Period (1603‒1867) is especially rich with these details. Therefore, the expected 
feeding back of proﬁ ts to create a consumption boom did not happened as forecast.
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Schapiro and Morson also show how negative economic policies imposed to sanction regions in 
conﬂ ict with the United States can also lack insights into the cultural mind-sets of its people that 
are present in literature. As mentioned previously, the examples of Russia’s adaption to US 
sanctions on cheap imports and credit restrictions after Russia’s involvement in Crimea in 2014, 
showed a stoic character trait found in the literature of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. Schapiro and 
Morson detail that Russian’s value their national pride and identity to a greater degree than their 
economic well-being, more so than an American. Hardship and overcoming it is more prevalent 
in Russian works of literature than in other nations and imposing sanctions merely ignited their 
Russian sensibilities. 
For Schapiro and Morson, treating economics as an art form as much as an applied science is to 
use it as a force for helping people ﬁ rst before wealth creation. They argue this was the classic 
eighteenth century capitalist Economist Adam Smith’s true aim. Literature gives the economist 
access to feelings and motivations that might prove an economic model to be inappropriate when 
applied under a different perspective. Ideally, travelling and living in a foreign country offers 
similar insights but can be impractical. Schapiro and Morson’s humanist response sees 
companies, ﬁ rms, workers and consumers as people ﬁ rst and that capital markets often move on 
sentiments as much as they do on cold hard numbers. 
Broadly, Schapiro and Morson focus on classic literature to understand character traits in 
diﬀ erent places, but it can be argued that watching online videos, reading blogs and following 
social media streams can add similar, and more rapid, insights into regional culture for future 
economic decisions. Schapiro adds that in a 2016 survey of American economists, only 42% said 
reading literature from other academic ﬁ elds would help them in formulating economic policies, 
he says that economics has fallen behind anthology, sociology, and psychology in expanding its 
ﬁ eld of human experience and inﬂ uence.    
II. Guns, Germs and Steel Revisited
Applying the humanities and literature to understanding some of the pitfalls of economic policies 
is one useful alternative, another way to analyse global diﬀ erences would be through the lens of 
geography and evolutionary biology. Looking deeper in to how a particular culture’s literature 
and art was produced could still further prove that speciﬁ c regions are explicitly diﬀ erent. The 
China and the New Globalization
－ 79 －
landscape, climate, and human migration around a particular topography could have a more 
profound effect on how successful a region was in terms of harvesting, fighting diseases, 
expanding into new areas and generally surviving. Evolutionary biologist Jared Diamond 
formulated a theory that human genetics and racial factors were not the reason one group 
prospered and thrived over others. Diamond wrote in his book ‘Guns, Germs and Steel’ (1997) 
that the environmental diﬀ erences between continents are the main reasons for diﬀ erences in 
human developmental stages. He says that broadly speaking the speed and evolution of human 
development can be viewed in three district areas: I) Africa, II) The Americas, III) Eurasia.  The 
difficulties in Area I, classed as Africa (and Australia), are the toughest climates with harsh 
temperatures that are not suitable for farming. There are less species able to be domesticated 
and no large and deep waterways for transportation and goods exchanges. Here the emphasis is 
on survival rather than prosperity as the population grows slowly. Area II is the Americas which 
has more resources and species of animals and plants than Area I but the climate is diﬀ erent 
across the land mass. Therefore, the techniques for farming and adaption to life on the land mass 
changes from Arctic in the north through temperate climates in the middle, down to tropical in 
the centre and mid-south on to Antarctic again towards the south. This means that much of the 
skills gained to survive in certain areas are not transferable. This makes cooperation more 
difficult and resources are wasted and not used efficiently. The final Area III spreads across 
Eurasia and is the most uniform in nature. Unlike Area II, the continent is wide and the largest 
axis is east to west so the climate and topography is more uniform. This land mass is the largest 
and even though disparate communities grow originally in isolation like in Area I, as they expand 
there can connect with others that have similar traits and applications to the environment that is 
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the same or similar. Through competition, goods and medicines for growing healthy populations 
are traded to fight diseases and to refine the harvesting technology of the natural resources. 
Particular also to Area III are the larger and deeper waterways connecting disparate regions with 
access to water-based transportation. Diamond says that because the people from Area III 
developed technology quicker and had more robust immune systems they were able to travel 
and colonise the other weaker two areas that could not ﬁ ght to defend their region. Importantly, 
Diamond stresses the point that the human genetics of all three areas were not factors and that 
any combination of people from all three areas could produce the same results over time given a 
change in location.  
Diamond’s views has been praised by diﬀ erent intellectual and academic groups, which is also 
part of the problems with his work. For the post-modern left academics so derided by Peterson, 
Diamond’s work oﬀ ers a history of man’s identity as power relationships constructed outside of 
the true factors of superiority that are location advantages, agricultural provision and climate. 
Also, it is noticeable that the Chinese plan for the Belt and Road Initiative discussed earlier ﬁ t 
over the same land mass that Diamond says has been the most gifted and has dominated 
throughout history. 
Diamond’s views on evolution allow for alternative histories of power formation and of human 
success and failure. However, without steps to learn and modify human behaviour in the light of 
these geographical factors, Diamond’s work becomes nothing more than environmental 
determinism and by extension human determinism to grow, invade, conquer and rule with little 
self-control over those actions. Therefore, the Mongolian Empire and the European Crusades that 
spanned Eurasia until the thirteenth century were the simple robotic actions of environmental 
lottery winners. Diamond’s lack of agency and sometimes contradiction is evident in this analysis 
of Australia, a country he would categorize in Area I. He says that regions in this category are 
permanently struggling and that choices are limited to evolve. At the same time, he says that one 
factor hindering the region of Australia is that it survived well because of British rule, helping to 
combat the elements with construction techniques and how to organise a society with laws. 
However, the lack of adaption to Asian rule, by this he means China, and the continued clasping 
of British rule will result in the decline of Australia.
Diamond has been criticised for backing the evolutionary winners with hindsight and attributing 
no value to indigenous cultures to be fully human and sustainable. His views on humanness are 
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overlooked as he is a strong advocate for climate change theory and his books have been 
promoted as a core text for The National Geographic Society. 
III. Chinese Meritocracy or Authoritarianism
Diamond views of geographical advantage over societal democracy do reﬂ ect a growing support 
for Asian values superseding those of European ones. Daniel A Bell writes in his book ‘The China 
Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy’ (2015) that the system of one man 
one vote is rapidly being challenged by the success of systems of meritocratic authority in Asia 
based on skills training, constant evaluation and longer tenure and circles of governance.  Bell 
argues that democratic elections at lower levels of regional government are good as they can 
represent a zeal and passion for an area that local people see, relate to and understand as being 
close to their own experience. However, at higher national levels, party selected candidates with 
years of planning experience through training produce more sustainable public works and 
provisional stability. Bell states that modern China is neither a liberal democracy nor an 
authoritarian state but one of political meritocracy. If the election of the 45th President of the 
United States Donald Trump is judged on the number of years spent in training for the oﬃ  ce, 
Bell’s view of China’s model stacks up well. 
Bell makes the point that meritocratic rule is a model and does not exist in China without 
examples of corruption and mismanagement, yet he is clear in stating that meritocracy is a 
reestablishment of the two thousand year old traditional of imperial rule in China by emperors of 
various dynasties that produced a stable civilisation, art, and technologies such as 
paper, porcelain, and gunpowder. China is moving back to this system after a period of 
communism and unrest and that it is in essence a good thing for systems to limit democracy at 
higher levels. 
Oxford Professor Stein Ringen disagrees with Bell’s rather rosy view of the modern Chinese 
regime and says in his book ‘The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century’ that Chinese 
success has a much shorter history on the world stage and that the Communist party is desperate 
to maintain power at all costs. Reductions in poverty rates in China is merely a by-product of a 
good balance of payments and clever sating of regions by a system of ﬁ nancial control. On the 
idea that merit is the determinant factor in employment at the higher levels of regional 
government, Stein says that the ability to produce successful regional economies is secondary to 
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securing party power and control in each region with loyalty the highest virtue. This point can be 
more clearly understood by asking local Hong Kong and Taiwanese people how happy there are 
with the changes in governance by Beijing. Unlike the agricultural areas of China that were 
offered economic rewards from the central government in the form of salary increasing and 
improvements in living standards, Taiwan and Hong Kong have achieved higher economic 
success from free trade, strong basic education, and democratic elections. Stein says that 
democratic systems are in their own way highly meritocratic because the selection processes and 
the levels of scrutiny are rigorous and importantly done as much by a free press as by a political 
party. He sees China less as a marvel of the modern world but as a normal country with 
demographic, structural and economic problems. China is unique in terms of population size and 
density, second only to India, but should nevertheless not be overly feared, stereotyped or 
praised as mystical by western nations.
IV. Conclusion ‒ Intervention is not the answer 
Whether the rise of Chinese power helps to establish a multi-polar world that E.H. Carr saw as a 
healthy balance or that China is the next global super-power, it is clear that regionalism and the 
culture that grows from a mixture of climate, food production, manufacture, social interaction, 
language, a shared history and a passing on of techniques can produce the optimal levels of 
economic and social well-being. If trading markets are truly free, then the best products and 
services can be produced in the region they are best suited for and surpluses exported if they are 
recognised to be the best. This leaves other areas to focus on what they are best at to make what 
they need and sell their surpluses. 
If we consider the manufacturing history of countries like Japan and Germany, the types of cars, 
computer printers, railway systems and general household electronics that they produce have 
dominated the world time and again through wars, economic down-turns and memberships to 
global trade agreements. Equally, the roots of Russia’s power and expansion to an empire in the 
1950s and its recover after its eventual collapse in the 1990s were similar techniques of local 
farming, cheap public transport and free housing. Now, Russia has rebuilt itself to be a powerful 
player on the world stage rather than a dominator.    
More than one factor leads a country or region to excel in certain areas and all of these factors 
should be considered when assessing a country’s true wealth. It is a failure when a more 
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successful country tries to dominate another without appreciating all its qualities from 
productivity to diet to literature and culture. Pushing countries and region to perform operations 
that they are unfamiliar with or are a cultural anathema to may well be suppressing a resentment 
that will come back as protest or worse.
Here, China must break from the past and not follow the mind-set of other regional rulers. The 
United States has ruled under its view of itself as exceptional and therefore angelic, the British 
did the same in its time ruling India in the ninetieth and early twentieth centuries and in 
southern China in the mid-1850s. Japan did the same to China in the 1930s, and Israel has been 
blaming Palestine for making them kill Palestinians since 1945. Germany’s racial purity and 
extermination of the Jewish people in Europe followed a similar pattern. Russia sort to control 
many Eastern European nations from the 1950s until the 1990s. All of these actors used their 
economic and military power to dominate, all of them thought their way of life was superior to 
their colonised inferiors, and all of them eventually failed or are in the process of failing.  
The way for the new rising power of China to be exceptional would be for China to change the 
course of history and not think of itself as exceptional. To honour the regionalism they are 
engaged with and to respect the cultures outside their own where appropriate is their task. To 
read as much economic, social and political history as possible along with their great works of 
literature and watch everything on YouTube is imperative before considering its best course of 
action on the world stage. Social historian Jonathan Rose, in his book ‘The Intellectual Life of the 
British Working Classes’, wrote that before the advent of the centrally controlled media of Radio, 
Cinema, and later Television, many of the British working classes would read as a form of escape 
from hard work. He comments that many working class people in the 1930s in Britain were 
more literate than some of the people in the classes above them. With the global access to any 
media and any book on a handheld electronic device, the situation that many workers around the 
world now find themselves in is reminiscent of that of early twentieth century Britain. 
Underestimating the intelligence of the global workers that Chinese state run programs seeks to 
engage with in the future must take this into account. It remains to be seen if their speed of 
change and eagerness to spend their capital will result in the further destabilization of regions 
and communities.    
（サイモン　メイソン・高崎経済大学地域政策学部非常勤講師）
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